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Effective disaster management requires advanced planning. News media centers, public information hot-lines,
and on-site volunteer procedures must be established in anticipation of large scale emergencies.
In the following article, Kartez reviews the disaster planning programs and policies of 250 public agencies
associated with disaster-prone communities. The study describes managerial perspectives of disaster planning
policy. The article is a guide for planners concerned with the complexities of community crisis mitigation.
community disaster
planning
A frequent finding of research on disasters is the
need for local government to anticipate how the
community reacts to a large scale crisis. Commu-
nity disaster plans do not always acknowledge that
the independent actions which citizens, news media
and other agencies take are factors that management
must anticipate. For example, at a recent airline
crash in Louisiana that killed 154 people and
demolished a neighborhood, fire-fighters command-
ing the scene were overwhelmed by spectators and
would-be helpers whose presence was triggered by
inaccurate media reports. This problem of "con-
vergence behavior" has been observed in disasters
for almost three decades, but public managers are
often caught by surprise. Perry (1979) has called pre-
disaster use of this kind of insight "research-based
community disaster planning." Through this ap-
proach, local officials can "work with people's
known reaction patterns" and avoid "making admin-
istratively devised plans that potentially create more
problems than they solve" (1979: 446).
Implementation Problems
Transfer of this planning philosophy to local prac-
tice has not been as rapid as many would like. After
a nationwide International City Management Asso-
ciation analysis of local planning in 1982, the study's
director complained that:
What is puzzling is, that after years of research
on organizational behavior in disasters, local
government continues to be surprised when
the standard operating procedures in their
lengthy, detailed response plans turn out to be
irrelevant in the disaster (Hoetmer 1984: 1).
If researchers' suggestions for local government had
little real utility in the event, the above complaint
would not be very important. However, such is not
the case. Imagine, for example, you had been a key
administrator in Wichita Falls, Texas, during its
devastating 1979 tornado. 1 In addition to wrestling
with obvious demands for treating casualties, restor-
ing services and so on, you would have found
yourself making totally unplanned decisions to meet
needs like these:
— Appointing the City Attorney to organize
a news media information center;
— Assigning firefighters to hand-deliver a
"disaster newsletter" to neighborhoods in the
days before phones were restored;
— Running a city-staffed information "hot-
line" for citizen needs when phones were
restored; and
— Designating a single staff member to cope
with the continuous appearance of unoffi-
cial volunteer help and fit them into the
overall response.
This is an account of work supported by National
Science Foundation grant 8217550. The views ex-
pressed are those of the authors and do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions of the Foundation.
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Volunteers prepare sandbags to hold back the flood waters Ravel! Call
These unplanned strategies of community organiza-
tion are very similar to those suggested by research
on disaster planning needs, and other studies of ac-
tual disaster response have made similar findings
(Drabek et al. 1981; Kartez 1984). None of these ac-
tions were planned, and often on-the-spot adaptive
planning is difficult if not impossible. Clearly
research suggestions do have potential utility to local
government. To not respond to these demands of
community behavior results in emergency decision
centers jammed with newsmen (Coalinga in 1983);
confused citizens trying to sort "news" and rumor
from vital instructions (Mt. St. Helens in 1980); and
volunteers duplicating or interfering with the efforts
of public agencies (Louisiana air crash). At the very
least, needed resources can be overlooked because
planning did not anticipate the sheer numbers of adaptive planning
people that are involved in a community-wide crisis.
Management Opinion Survey
The principal question guiding our research asks:
Do top managers in local fire, police, public works
and executive departments consider it important and
feasible to anticipate and plan for these aspects of
disaster events? Despite the several decades of
research recommendations and case studies, there questioning its
is surprisingly little knowledge of how the poten- importance
tial users of research view this question. To explore
it, we asked the heads of emergency-relevant depart-
ments in 80 California, Washington and Utah
localities to evaluate the effectiveness of three
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"research-based" strategies for meeting community
demands.
These examples have been "adaptively" planned
planning for in the heat of emergencies (Kartez 1982) as well as
social demands offered in the research literature. They included: 1)
anticipating the predictable appearance of unofficial
citizen helpers with an "Untrained Volunteer Plan",
2) preparing for the onslaught of large numbers of
radio and TV personnel with a "Media Information
Center" plan, and: 3) maintaining the capability to
meet public information needs through, for ex-
Table 1
Preparedness Strategies Evaluated
OBSERVED PROBLEMS:
Convergence of Helpers: Citizens
flock to disaster, both as sources of help and
as spectators who obstruct lifesaving
operations.
SUGGESTED PLANNING STRATEGY:
Untrained Volunteer Plan: Pre-desig-
nate one public agency to be responsible for
expecting these citizen actions and to ac-
tively give direction to volunteerism.
Media Overload: The news media is
the chief means of rapid communication
with the public, but often overwhelming
numbers of outside newspeople cause inac-
curacies and physically obstruct operations.
Media Information Center: Create
incentives for the media to use accurate
information. Plan for a central location
where media will be given frequent face-to-
face information from credible officials.
Mass Public Information: Citizens
can overwhelm agencies with demands for
instructions in the critical first days of
response, jamming switchboards and dis-
tracting key agencies. However, the public
needs a source of confirmatory information.
Disaster Information Hotline: Ar-
range in advance for the capability to oper-
ate and staff phone bank staffed by per-
sonnel who will give citizens vital instruc-
tions on protective actions, squelch rumors
and ease pressures on other agencies to
answer citizen demands for information.
Disaster Resources: Needs for physi-
cal resources often outstrip local capability.
Public agencies have to make simultaneous
decisions on committing public funds as op-
portunities for help appear, with no time
for observing routine business practices.
Emergency Resource Rules: Speed
procurement of special resources or person-
nel by prespecifying streamlined authoriza-
tion procedures for all departments that
may have emergency resource needs.
ample, a "Phone Hotline" plan. A fourth strategy
of a strictly internal, administrative nature was also
included for the purpose of comparing opinions:
adopting "Emergency Resource Rules"— that is,
authorizing local agencies in advance to bend
normal administrative procedures for procuring
needed resources in a disaster. These four examples
are further described in Table 1.
We asked managers in three earthquake-prone
metropolitan regions — the San Francisco Bay area,
Washington's Puget Sound basin, and Utah's Salt
Lake City area — to participate in this study. Cities
and counties in these areas were considered to be
administrative decisions
generally quite familiar with disaster planning needs.
The expectation was that this sample would allow
for an informed evaluation of the following ques-
tions: 1) Is there a perceived need to plan for the
"social" demands of disaster management? 2) Are
research-based strategies difficult to adopt and what
are their potential constraints? 3) Do factors like ex-
perience with disasters, involvement in the planning
process or jurisdiction size (a proxy for resources)
make any difference?
A total of 250 out of 300 managers replied to the
survey. Officials from public works (23%), fire
(22%), municipal police (18%), emergency services
(12%), sheriffs (6%) and executive departments
(8%) participated. An attempt was made to gain the
response of a cross-section of key managerial disci-
plines in each of the 80 jurisdictions. Over three-
quarters of the participants represented the top man-
agement positions of their respective local agencies.
The following discussion analyzes how public
managers view the need to plan, the feasibility of
and obstacles to the suggested planning actions, the
influence of contextual factors like experience and
planning involvement, and the implications for local
disaster planning practice. The results are also of in-
terest to us as planners because of the light it sheds
on some of the difficulties of planning for unfamiliar
and remote community crises.
It should be kept in mind, though, that disaster
response planning is quite unlike community land
use or development planning. The process revolves
around highly specialized line agencies, not commu-
nity interest groups and policy analysts. Decisions
on what to plan for are essentially administrative
in nature, not legislative. Fire, public health, police
and emergency medical agencies respond to well-
defined emergencies every day. However, in a disas-
ter, these same agencies often find their roles ex-
panded in unexpected ways because of the sudden
involvement of virtually every sector of the commu-
nity: individual citizens, voluntary groups, the news
media and so on.
The Need to Plan
How significant are some typical disaster response
demands in the eyes of public managers? A majority
viewed controlling crowds, giving citizens instruc-
tions and finding outside resources as somewhat ex-
treme problems (Table 2). Organizing volunteers
and meeting the news media's demands for informa-
tion were viewed as less troublesome. Bay Area
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managers facing long term earthquake risks, how-
ever, view most of these potential problems as more
significant than do their Washington State counter-
parts. Utah officials viewed only crowd control as
an extreme problem, in the wake of their massive
1983 flood fighting experience which involved thou-
sands of citizen volunteers.
Table 2
Managerial Views of Response Demands
Little or Some Great
PROBLEM AREA No Problem Problems Problems
Controlling Crowds
Washington' 18% 53% 29%
California 13% 52% 35%
Utah 28% 36% 36%
Organizing Volunteers
Washington 35% 40% 25%
California 22% 52% 26%
Utah 71% 29% 0%
Giving Citizens Instructions
Washington 27% 40% 33%
California 14% 42% 44%
Utah 64% 29% 7%
Media Info. Demands
Washington 38% 36% 16%
California 32% 41% 27%
Utah 78% 22% 0%
Finding Resources
Washington 25% 48% 27%
California 13% 43% 44%
Utah 57% 36% 7%
"Washington N = 98
California N = 137
Utah N = 14
Do managers see a need to plan in advance to
manage these problems? Table 3 shows the answer
is a qualified yes. A majority of the surveyed
managers agreed that meeting the demands of out-
side actors (volunteers, the media and citizen needs
for public information) will be quite difficult
without prior planning. However, all agreed that
meeting the need to find outside resources would
not be difficult because of internal, administrative
rules. Clearly, managers make a distinction between
the need for internal arrangements like "bending the
rules" and the external demands of working with
the community. The majority viewed external, com-
munity demands as nonroutine and requiring antic-
ipatory planning. The key question is to what extent
this planning is taking place or is viewed as feasi-
ble if not already under way.
Sharing Emergency Planning Assumptions
Most managers considered planning for these
demands somewhat feasible, if not already under
way in their jurisdictions. About one-third of all
California and Washington departments reported
the availability of emergency resource rules and
media information center arrangements, as shown
in Table 4. Fewer reported citizen volunteer plans
in place, and only 12% of the 250 departments re-
ported arrangements for public information hot-
lines. However, 40% to 50% viewed resource rules,
media centers and citizen volunteer plans as quite
likely to be developed in the future. It was only in
the case of hotlines that a sizeable number of depart-
ments foresaw little or no chance of adoption.
These findings have to be qualified, though. Con-
sistency between departmental opinions in the same
city or county varied a great deal. In many cases,
only one out of several departments reported the
Table 3
Difficulty of Meeting Disaster Demands
With No Pla:nning
Not Very Somewhat Much More
DEMAND.- Difficult Difficult Difficult
Procuring Resources
With No Streamlined
Rules
Washington 60% 28% 21%
California 58% 25% 27%
Utah 43% 29% 28%
Managing Volunteers
With No Volun. Plan
Washington 22% 21% 57%
California 16% 18% 66%
Utah 21% 36% 43%
Managing Public
Information With No
Media Center Plan
Washington 21% 29% 50%
California 11% 24% 65%
Utah 36% 14% 50%
Setting Up Hotline
Without Contingency
Plan
Washington 18% 22% 60%
California 15% 21% 64%
Utah 21% 36% 43%
formal incorporation of a given strategy in their
response plans. In other cases, different departments
in the same city or county reported adoption of dif-
ferent strategies. These inconsistencies illustrate one
of the peculiar and somewhat troublesome aspects
bending the rules
sharing experience
confidence in proven
strategies
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of community disaster response planning. Agencies
are used to responding to specific emergencies where
their expertise places them in fairly certain com-
mand of the situation (e.g. a fire or a major acci-
dent). In a community-wide emergency, however,
Table 4
Feasibility of Adopting Strategies: Individual Views
Little or 50-50 Good Already
STRATEGY: No Chance Chance Chance Adopted
Emergency Resource
Rules
Washington 6% 16% 50% 28%
California 4% 15% 46% 35%
Utah 7% 0% 36% 57%
Untrained Volunteer
Plan
Washington 20% 27% 39% 14%
California 15% 21% 44% 20%
Utah 0% 0% 14% 86%
Media Information
Center
Washington 12% 19% 39% 31%
California 11% 17% 40% 32%
Utah 7% 7% 22% 65%
Public Information
Hotline
Washington 27% 31% 30% 12%
California 33% 23% 31% 12%
Utah 14% 0% 36% 50%
every agency is responding at once. The commu-
nity and news media are heavily involved and, as
Lois McCoy of the National Search and Rescue
Association pointed out not long ago, what you get
is "apples, oranges and bananas all responding
together. . each to his or her special emergency."
Awareness by apples of what oranges have
planned for could be useful. For example, out of 54
departments reporting adoption of citizen volunteer
plans in this sample, only five were fire departments.
Fire departments need to know that plans exist,
however, for keeping citizen helpers from over-
whelming and distracting their personnel in a large
scale disaster — as was the case in the air crash inci-
dent described at the outset of this article. Similarly,
out of 31 departments reporting arrangements for
public information hotlines, only two were fire
departments. Even in some smaller emergencies, fire
dispatch personnel are often overwhelmed with calls
from the public. Thus, provisions for steering calls
away from essential communications in a major
disaster can have benefits for first-response agencies
like fire departments. The point here is that in a
major disaster, a great number of citizens will be
seeking information on what protective actions to
take. They cannot be ignored. Awareness of the total
disaster planning strategy, however, is often
overlooked because of the greater immediacy of each
agencies' day-to-day approach to their own routine
emergency responsibilities.
Explaining Patterns of Adoption
Even though individual departments are not often
aware of the specialized plans that have been made
for a major community disaster, the patterns of
reported adoption of our four strategies illustrated
some important influences at the jurisdictional level:
experience, size and a tendency to build on the
familiar before investing in new methods. Tables 5
and 6 illustrate the role of experience in adopting
what managers rated as the less feasible and less
familiar strategies: citizen volunteer plans and public
information hotlines. Jurisdictions where no depart-
ments have experience with these problems were
highly unlikely to have any departments reporting
adoption of either strategy. In the case of size, it was
found that jurisdictions with populations over
75,000 were about twice as likely to report adop-
Table 5
Operational Experience
With Volunteer Management
vs. Adoption of Untrained Volunteer Plans
Departmental
Experience:
N = 77 Jurisdictions
Adopted Not Adopted
One or More
Departments Have
Disaster Experience 62% 38% 100% (42)
One or More
Departments Have
Emergency Experi-
ence (But not
Disaster) 29% 71% 100% (24)
No Departments
Report Experience 36% 64% 100% (11)
TOTAL 48% 52% 100% (77)
tion of each of the strategies than were smaller
jurisdictions. This probably points out the role of
greater resources in allowing specialization to meet
such needs. Of course, smaller communities also
face a need to deal with community volunteers and
public information needs in a disaster (see Kartez
1984).
protective actions cannot
be ignored
adopting volunteer plans
inconsistent responses
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Table 6
Operational Experience With Disaster or Emergency
assessing the perceived Hotlines vs. /\aoption ot a notune nan
costs N = 77 Jurisdictions
Departmental
Experience:
Adopted Not Adopted
One or More Depart-
ments Have Disaster
Experience 64% 36% 100% (25)
One or More Depart-
ments Have Emer-
gency Experience
(But Not Disaster) 63% 37% 100% (8)
No Departments
Report Experience 11% 89% 100% (44)
TOTAL 34% 66% 100% (77)
building on the familiar
Number of
Strategies
Adopted
We also found that jurisdictions tend to build on
the familiar before working out community disaster
response plans shown in Table 7. Table 7 shows that
unless a jurisdiction adopts one of the more widely
accepted planning strategies (e.g., emergency
resource rules or media arrangements), it is less like-
ly to have made arrangements for more usual de-
Table 7
Patterns of Adoption by Jurisdictions
Resource Volunteer Media Public No. of
Rules Plan Cntr. Hotline Localities
Only 1 Adopted 57% 0% 43% 0% 12
Two Adopted 79% 36% 64% 7% 16
Three Adopted 80% 75% 90% 40% 21
All 4 Adopted 100% 100% 100% 100% 15
comprehensive strategies
mands (e.g., volunteer plans and public information
strategies like a hotline). For example, virtually all
(92%) of the cities and counties reporting arrange-
ments for a public hotline also have plans working
closely with the news media to disseminate public
information in a crisis. Unfortunately, jurisdictions
that have not planned for media's involvement in
disaster public information problems have not
planned for the alternative either. These results sug-
gest that management is less likely to develop com-
prehensive strategies for a disaster problem like
public information unless the process has started
with applying the simpler and/or more familiar
experiences of management to the potential prob-
lems faced in a disaster.
Perceived Obstacles to Disaster Planning
Responding to disasters is a unique area of public
service policy because it is the one instance where,
under most state statues, localities are free to plan
for and carry out virtually any physical, fiscal or
organizational task in a disaster. This makes the in-
dividual views and intentions of key public man-
agers an essential part of planning for community
response and, frankly, the major ingredient in deter-
mining what kinds of plans will result.
In an attempt to assess the acceptability of the
planning methods included in our survey, individual
views on several obstacles to adoption were col-
lected. These obstacles included perceived costs,
legal constraints, lack of operational benefits and
low administrative priority for disaster planning.
They were selected for inclusion in the survey based
on a pilot study of managerial views carried out in
1983 (Kartez and Kelley 1985). The following discus-
sion outlines the extent to which the larger sample
of managers viewed these constraints as significant.
Resource Rules: Thirty-six percent of the 250 man-
agers surveyed agreed that they have the informal
ability to "bend administrative rules" in a disaster
without formal arrangements. Most (75%) consider
the ability to make flexible decisions in a disaster,
without the burden of routine administrative con-
straints, as being essential. Only 30% believe there
are legal obstacles to doing this. This is a good
example of where a perceived constraint does not
really exist, as statutes in all of the states surveyed
here provide for local suspension of routine pro-
cedures in a formally declared disaster. This points
out that the planning process does not always
change perceptions of how a disaster situation is dif-
ferent from the traditional legal constraints on
public service administration. Finally, ninety-two
managers (37%) believed that disaster planning will
need greater administrative priority before emer-
gency resource rules will be formally adopted in
their jurisdiction's plans.
Volunteer Plans: A large majority (80%) agreed that
individual citizens can provide a useful resource in
a disaster response. A smaller proportion (30%)
qualified this opinion by saying that only trained
volunteers would be useful. Half (47%) saw the risk
of legal liability as a drawback to making plans for
using volunteers. Again, state statues provide special
authorization for use of volunteers in a declared disas-
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ter, with reduced liability risks for local government.
Given the probability that many key department
heads are not aware of these provisions, the concerns
surrounding legal liability have a negative effect on
planning possibilities. One-third stated that the lack
of staff to supervise volunteers is also an obstacle
to their use. One-third also stated that disaster plan-
ning will need higher priority before effort will be
expended to plan for volunteer organization.
Media Centers: Few managers appear willing to
leave disaster relationships with the media com-
pletely unplanned. A total of 81% disagreed with
the idea some managers have espoused that "A me-
dia center isn't worth planning because they'll find
us anyway." Only 21% felt that staff needs are an
obstacle to planning for and operating a media in-
formation center in a disaster. However, despite the
high acceptability and perceived benefits of this
strategy, 30% believe disaster planning will need
higher local priority before such arrangements will
be made.
Disaster Hotlines: An alternative to complete reli-
ance on the commercial media for disseminating di-
saster public information was regarded as having
some benefits (40%) or great benefits (40%).
Equally, 80% of managers surveyed believe citizens
will call a hotline to get instructions and information
in a prolonged community disaster response and re-
covery. Tempering this enthusiasm, however, was
the response of 57% of all managers who questioned
the survival of phone systems in a major disaster.
This was more of a drawback among earthquake-
wary California managers (68%) than among Wash-
ington (46%) or Utah (36%) managers. Many of
those responding cited a lack of staff (43%) and the
costs of hotline equipment (38%) as principal ob-
stacles to providing for a public hotline. About 40%
believe that disaster planning needs greater priority
before such arrangements will be made.
Positive Factors
Two factors also appear to have positive, rather
than dampening influences on individual opinions
about adopting these disaster response planning
strategies: operational experience and involvement
in the planning process. The managers in this sam-
ple have had much more operational experience
with acquiring emergency resources and providing
emergency public information to the media than ex-
perience with managing citizen volunteers or operat-
ing special information efforts like hotlines. Those
departments with volunteer and hotline experience
rate these two strategies as much more feasible, on
average, than managers without such experience.
Experience with public information efforts in general
also made a strong difference in the opinions of
Washington participants. As a group, they have had
liabilities of volunteers
Ravell Call
The streets of Salt Lake City served as a river course during the 1980 flood
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professional exchange
communication problems
exercises as learning
experiences
less experience in this area (56%) than either Califor-
nia (75%) or Utah (86%) participants.
Departmental involvement in disaster planning
also made a moderately positive difference in re-
sponses regarding the three community-oriented
strategies (volunteers, media and mass public infor-
mation). Managers whose departments have com-
mitted staff to disaster planning responsibilities or
who frequently participate in planning activities
with other agencies view the chances of adopting
planning arrangements as being better.
No single factor was found to completely explain
variations in local planning choices and opinions.
It can be said, though, that jurisdictions which 1)
have departments experienced in community disas-
ter behavior; 2) have departments which are in-
volved in ongoing disaster planning activities and;
3) have managers which value disaster planning as
a priority are those most likely to devote effort to
these needs.
Planning Implications
The results of this survey are not necessarily sur-
prising but they do point out that local government
willingness and ability to plan for unfamiliar demands
of a crisis are affected by a mixture of influences, in-
cluding experience, good intra-organizational commu-
nications, and support from top management. Each
ingredient plays a key role. The most troublesome
aspect of community crisis planning, of which disas-
ter planning is only one component, is the basic dif-
ficulty of planning for unfamiliar, hence somewhat
unreal, problems. Because of this, experience plays
a great role in shaping perceptions of what to plan
for.
The results of this survey show that a good deal
of experience could be shared within the confines
of one city or county's personnel. This is especially
true recalling that many cities and counties are less
familiar with disaster planning requirements than
those in the regions covered here. As time goes by,
individual agencies' assumptions about what is being
planned for and what can and should be included in
plans tend to drift apart. Different experiences and
perspectives on the structure of relevant problems
may lead to different expectations of planned solu-
tions. Because of this problem, the most common
local disaster planning activity involves an annual
simulated crisis decision making exercise. As a re-
cent Federal Emergency Management Agency plan-
ning handbook points out: "Key leaders more often
than not will not know what the local plan provides
for, even if personnel from their own departments
have participated in developing it .. . the ability to
conduct coordinated lifesaving operations can only
be developed by exercises."
Local emergency coordinators often have diffi-
culty securing key management's participation in
these exercises, as well as involving the departments
in an ongoing process. Out of the several hundred
departments participating in this survey, only half
participated in planning activities more than once
in the preceding year. Under these conditions, plans
can become obsolete or changed without notice.
Sharing knowledge and experience more frequently
could have an impact on planning choices and the
quality of coordination. Although exercises are
essential, resistance to them can be stiff because they
are performance-oriented rather than forums for
discussion. As the emergency manager in one ur-
ban county of over one million put it: "Exercises
sometimes embarrass the department heads, and
we're not trying to do that. Our approach has
changed to a learning experience, not putting them
on the spot."
Table 8
Preferences for Planning Information
Little or Some Great
Info. Sources No Benefit Benefit Benefit
Talk w/ Experienced
Managers 4% 35% 61%
Seminars on Cases 11% 52% 38%
All-Day Exercises 16% 51% 33%
Tabletop Exercises 19% 56% 25%
Written Case Studies 29% 60% 12%
We asked this sample of managers to rate the
benefits of several different sources of information
on disaster planning needs, including exercises
(Table 8). A clear preference was expressed for get-
ting this information from contact with professional
colleagues who have managed large scale disaster
responses in other areas. Case studies and emer-
gency exercises were also favored methods.
This finding created a dilemma given the other
results of the survey; there is clearly a good deal
of experience that can and should be shared between
the agencies in the same city or county. For example,
managers that perceive certain legal obstacles need
to know what arrangements already exist that nul-
continued on page 45
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lify such problems. More complex are the dissimilar
expectations and assumptions of key managers in-
volved in disaster relief.
Many studies of private sector management have
found that decision makers tend to act on what they
know, sometimes to great disadvantage in the face
of changing environmental demands (Smart 1978).
New organizational planning processes have been
developed whose objective is to "surface strategic
assumptions" among the key actors in large institu-
tions (Mason and Mitroff 1981). The focus of these
procedures is not on facts and expertise, but on the
perceptions and assumptions made by individuals.
A similar process for sharing assumptions is needed
in community disaster planning — one that falls
somewhere between the seat-of-the-pants decisions
of an exercise and the boring nature of research
reports. Although these kinds of opportunities are
becoming more available at FEMAs National Emer-
gency Training Center and the State of California's
Special Training Institute, limited numbers of train-
ing facilities cannot meet this demand on a national
scale.
This is certainly an area where professional plan-
ners can play a role, although opportunities are cur-
rently scarce. The most contact that the average local
planning director has with the disaster planning pro-
cess is receiving a copy of the new plan every few
years and finding that he or she has been designated
director of emergency housing in event of a disaster.
As one planning director pointed out to us, though,
there are techniques for participation and surfacing
objectives that are planners' stock-in-trade, and these
may be applicable to the complexities of disaster
planning.
There is also a lesson in disaster planning for plan-
ners that are concerned with the difficulties of antic-
ipating remote and unfamiliar community crises. A
major transportation shutdown or water shortage
requires a number of complex actions by a variety
of agencies — many of which are unaware of how a
total response should be coordinated (see Meyer and
Belobaba 1982). Like disaster planning, the prob-
lems are not just technical but organizational in
nature. Emergency managers can borrow the plan-
ning profession's process for discussing divergent
and sometimes conflicting views of disaster prob-
lems. As planners, we can learn from the lessons of
disaster management and apply them to a much
broader range of "crisis" situations to which our
localities are vulnerable.
Notes
1. This mini-case-study is based on remarks made
by Wichita Falls former city manager at the
National Emergency Training Center on August
22, 1984.
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